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chapter XIII, a debtor could only resort to voluntary bankruptcy, and
millions of dollars were being lost annually by creditors.1 0 Now much
of this can be recovered from a debtor's future earnings.
The purpose of section 14 (c) (5) is to prevent the creation of
a class of habitual bankrupts who might use the discharge element
of straight bankruptcy or composition plans at frequent intervals to
escape paying their debts in full."- The bar to habitual discharge sec-
tion was enacted in 1903.12 At that time there was no provision for
extensions. Normally, bankruptcy cases ended in the complete dis-
charge of a greater portion of the debt. As stated in In re Thompson, 3
"the reasons why a debtor should not be allowed to accomplish this
result as frequently as he chooses have no application to the situation
where the debtor offers to and does pay his debts in full." 4 In a
composition a debtor does not pay his debts in full, but receives a
partial discharge. Section 14 (c) (5) specifically bars a debtor
from resorting to this provision by arrangement or wage earner plan
by way of composition more than once within six years. The purposes
of the statutory bar have no application to extensions, since an exten-
sion contemplates the full payment of debts. The Holmes case reaches
the proper result in view of the purposes of both chapter XIII and
chapter III, section 14 (c) (5).
Joseph T. Burch
CoNsrrtmoNAL LAW-PROBABr CAUSE FOR SEARCH AND SEIzRE.-An
automobile riding low in the rear crossed a state line. Officers, on the
lookout for another vehicle suspected of carrying untaxed liquor,
stopped the automobile, searched it without a warrant, and found
untaxed liquor. The officers could not detect the liquor in any manner
before the search and had no information pertaining to this particular
automobile. The automobile was apparently being driven in a legal
manner. The trial court dismissed a forfeiture action against the
automobile on the ground of an unreasonable search. Held: Reversed.
The superior court found the search was reasonable on the basis of
probable cause and added: "A state should have the right to stop a
traveler coming into the state and to search his belongings to ascertain
whether he is bringing into the state any property upon which a tax
10 Ibid.
11 In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12, 13 (W.D. Va. 1943).
12 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 32 Stat. 797 (1903).
13 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
14 Id. at 13.
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is due." Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 199 Pa. Super.
428, 186 A.2d 52 (1962).
The fourth amendment of the federal constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ." The courts have placed the search of automobiles
within the protection of this amendment, thus requiring searches of
automobiles to meet the reasonableness standard.' The standard of
reasonableness almost universally 2 applied is the probable cause test.3
To constitute probable cause, the officer, acting as a reasonable man
under the circumstances, must have believed that an automobile was
carrying contraband.4
Evidence required for probable cause, which would justify a search
'without a warrant, is less than that required for conviction and has
been equated to the evidence necessary to obtain a search warrant.5
Mere suspicion, however, will not justify a search.6
Probable cause is a legal doctrine which is somewhat flexible and
variable in order to meet the almost endless variety of fact situations
to which it must be applied. This variety of situations makes the
statement of a definite, concise, universal rule extremely difficult, if not
impossible. In the search of an automobile without a warrant, courts
have found probable cause to exist where officers had information
from a reliable source that a certain automobile was carrying liquor,7
where evidence was obtained from any of the officers' senses that
contraband was being transported," and where a known dealer in
illegal liquor was seen in an area known for illegal transportation. 9
In many cases, several factors have been required in order to establish
probable cause for a search of an automobile.'
1 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2 Oklahoma is currently the only jurisdiction that does not follow the probable
cause test. Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1953); State v. Simpson, 91
Okla. Crim. 418, 218 P.2d 639 (1950).
3 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
479 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 66 (1952).
GMoore v. State, 138 Miss. 116, 103 So. 483 (1925).6 As a typical example of many cases so holding, see Nowlin v. State, 125
Tex. Cr. 390, 68 S.W.2d 496 (1934).
7People v. Bringardner, 233 Mich. 449, 206 N.W. 988 (1926).
s White v. State, 159 Miss. 503, 132 So. 599 (1931).
9 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10 JsieFlood, dissenting in Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,
quoted five factors listed in Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir.
1959), which may be considered by officers in establishing probable cause for a
search. These are:
1) the reputation of, or informant's reports concerning, the occupants,
2) a like reputation of the vehicle or owners, (3) the condition of the
vehicle (e.g., heavily loaded), (4) information from reputable informers
(Continued on next page)
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There are several cases factually similar to the principal case,
Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, where the courts have
held there was no probably cause for search. Two examples are where
a heavily loaded car, driving carefully in an area which had a bootleg
reputation, was stopped, 1 and where a heavily loaded car, coming
from a direction where considerable liquor was generally sold, was
stopped.12 Federal courts have held there is no probable cause for
search without a warrant when a known liquor dealer, driving a
heavily loaded automobile, increased speed when pursued.' 3
Certain emergency situations arise which make it necessary from
a policy standpoint to take a somewhat relaxed view of the probable
cause standard. The kidnaping of a child14 and the planting of a
bomb on an airplane are two situations in which the immediate
necessity of preserving human life surmounted strict interpretation of
the probable cause test. The routine illegal transportation of liquor is,
however, no such emergency, and "mere suspicion of violation of the
liquor laws is not enough to warrant the search without a warrant."f 5
The statement of the court in the principal case that any state has
the right to search anyone crossing its borders to ascertain whether he
is bringing into the state any taxable property is contrary to all the
requisites of search that have been outlined above. The court in the
principal case quotes from an opinion by Justice Taft as follows:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience
and indignity of such a search .... [Travelers may be searched at the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
as to the existence and illegal purpose of the trip, and (5) the reputation
of the location in which they are found.
It will be noted that the situation in Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
includes basically only factor number (3) above. Justice Flood further commented
that he could find no case where only the condition of the vehicle was probable
cause to justify a search. Justice Flood's comments may be found at 186 A.2d
52, 56.
11Emite v. United States, 15 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1926).
S *Harlow v. State, 159 Tenn. 537, 20 S.W.2d 1045 (1929).
13 Brinegar v. United States, 165 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947).
'4 Justice Flood at 186 A.2d 52, 57, also referred in his dissent to the words
of Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw
a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car.
However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, exe-
cuted fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject
travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life
and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a
roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and
catch a bootlegger.
15 Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1418, 1458 (1931).
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borders of a country] .... But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage with-
out interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official
authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. 16
This statement and its source were relied upon by the Pennsylvania
court in reversing the dismissal of the forfeiture action against the
automobile. Yet, after quoting the above statement, the court pro-
ceeded to issue its own statement, seemingly in direct conflict, to the
effect that a state has the right to stop ravelers crossing its borders to
search for taxable goods.
In the few cases on the subject, courts have not looked with favor
upon such routine border searches. A search at a county check station
roadblock, where the admitted purpose was "to curb the juvenile
problem and also check for ... anything that looked suspicious," was
held invalid in California. 17 On the basis of the foregoing, the result
and reasoning of Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan are
unsound. Simply because a car is riding low is no basis for a search;
there is no probable cause. If the result of the principal case were to
be followed widely, no citizen traveling upon the public highways
would be safe from unnecessary police harassment.
Paul E. Hieronymous
16 Carron v. United States 267 U.S. 182, 158-154 (1925).
17 People v. Gale, 294 P.2d 13, 15 (Cal. 1956).
